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DOCKET NO. . XM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, ) 
Plaintiff's and ) 
Appellants, 
vs. ) 
STAN WARREN, an individual, ) 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY, a partnership, ) 
Defendant's and ) 
Respondents. 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD, ESQ., #2455 
David Eccles Building, Suite 714 
385 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 393-5376 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN, ESQ., #3314 
360 South State Street 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
(801) 776-0533 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
ADDENDUM 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 
890194-CA 
DEPOSITED BV W E 
STATE Or" UTAH 
AUG 171990 
-2-
3. On or about April 9, 1986, the plaintiffs individually 
and collectively entered into a lease with defendants to lease Unit 
2 of a building at 12 South Main, Layton, Utah. 
4. That plaintiffs agreed pursuant to said lease to lease 
Unit #2 at 12 South Main, Layton, Utah, for a period of 3 years 
beginning April 5f <1986 until the last day of April, 1989 for 
$750.00 per month for the first year and $790.00 per month for 
years 2 and 3 of the lease. 
5. That plaintiffs further agreed pursuant to said lease not 
to permit damage to or defacement of the interior walls, floors, or 
ceiling or any other part of the interior of said building. 
Furtherr plaintiffs agreed to be responsible and pay for any damage 
done to Unit #2 at 12 South Main, Layton, Utah. 
6. That on or about March of 1987, plaintiffs willfully and 
intentionally breached their lease agreement with defendants, 
thereby causing defendants to lose a minimum of $860.00 in lost 
rental income. 
7. That plaintiff's left Unit #2 at 12 South Main, Layton, 
Utah inja considerable state of destruction, necessitating 
defendant to do substantial repair and replacement of the interior 
of Unit #2 in order for defendant to rent unit to a new tenant and 
that the defendants spent over $8,000.00 for repairs and 
replacement. 
F i S £ am 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD #2455 SEP 2j 1388 
Attorney for Plaintiffs __ 
2650 Washington Boulevard C!c!u7Lay~on Ci7ciiit"c\;.7,r~ 
S u i t e 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone No. 621-7613 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ! 
STAN WARREN, an individual ) 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY a partnership, ) 
Defendants. ] 
> MEMORANDUM RE DAMAGES 
> Civil No. 873000114 CV 
Disposition Following Trial 
This case involved the alleged breach (or lack thereof) by 
Plaintiffs, Lessees, of a three-year lease contracted with 
Defendants, Lessors. 
Plaintiffs were claiming a mutual recission of the lease 
contract and were seeking a refund of pre-paid rent ($500.00) and 
damages to a telephone system owned by them and allegedly damaged 
by Defendant's contractor in the process of renovating the 
premises for a new tenant lined up by Defendants. 
Defendants claimed Plaintiffs breached the lease and sought 
damages for lost rentals, damages for waste together with 
attorney's fees and court costs. (Paragraphs 6, 7 & 8 of 
Defendants Counterclaim) 
Following trial the Court found that Plaintiffs had 
breached the lease contract but reserved ruling on damages and 
invited the parties to submit memoranda with regard thereto. 
Defendants have filed a Memorandum and this writing is 
Plaintiffs Memorandum, which in part, will respond to Defendants 
Brief, but more importantly addresses the issue of damages based 
upon the law and evidence in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED ONLY TO DAMAGES REFLECTING 
RECOVERY OF EXPENDITURES, DAMAGED PROPERTY AND LOST RENTALS, 
Plaintiffs have no argument with the general law of damages 
cited by Defendants in the cases referenced in their Memorandum, 
but the law of damages cited and evidence offered by Defendants 
in this case are not the same. 
The measure and elements of damages upon a breach of a 
lease are the same as in breaches of other kinds of contracts. 
Breach by a tenant is much like a breach by a purchaser of a 
contract for sale and purchase of land. Damages are designed to 
be compensatory only, placing the non-defaulting party in the 
position he would have occupied but for the breach. 49 AmJur 2d, 
Landlord & Tenant §183. 
The Restatement of Contracts 2d recognizes that judicial 
remedies for breach of contract serve to protect one or more of 
the following interests of a Promissee; (a) his "expectation 
interest" which is his interest in having the benefit of his 
bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been 
in had the contract been performed; (b) his "reliance interest", 
which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by the 
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he 
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would have been in had t h e c o n t r a c t not been made; or (c) h i s 
" r e s t i t u t i o n i n t e r e s t " , which i s h i s i n t e r e s t in having r e s t o r e d 
t o him any b e n e f i t t h a t he has c o n f e r r e d upon t h e o t h e r p a r t y . 
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d §344, 
O b v i o u s l y , a p a r t y ' s c h o i c e of r e m e d i e s under t h e above 
f o r m u l a a r e u s u a l l y l i m i t e d by t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n and w i t h i n 
these f a c t u a l l i m i t a t i o n s , the choice i s up to the non-de fau l t i ng 
p a r t y . In our case , the choices or op t ions are indeed l i m i t e d by 
the f ac t s i t u a t i o n and the measure of damages must be appl ied to 
the f a c t s and the evidence . 
In our c a s e , t h e e v i d e n c e was t h a t upon l e a r n i n g t h a t t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s were going t o abandon the l e a s e , the Defendants l ined 
up a new t e n a n t a t a h i g h e r r e n t and for a l o n g e r t e r m . The 
e v i d e n c e was t h a t t h e r e was an i n t e r r u p t i o n in r e n t a l s of 
approximate ly f ive (5) weeks ( a l l of Apr i l and the f i r s t week of 
May, 1987). Defendants a re e n t i t l e d to the l o s t r e n t a l s for t h a t 
per iod of t ime based upon t h e i r "expec ta t ion i n t e r e s t " . 
Other t han t h e s h o r t i n t e r r u p t i o n in r e n t a l s , t h e r e i s no 
a d d i t i o n a l "expec ta t ion i n t e r e s t " which was l o s t by Defendants by 
r e a s o n of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y were a b l e t o r e - l e t t h e p r e m i s e s . 
Nor i s t h e r e any " r e s t i t u t i o n i n t e r e s t " for which the Defendants 
may be compensated under the d e f i n i t i o n above r e f e r r e d t o . The 
ba lance of damages, then, which Defendants would be e n t i t l e d to 
would be based upon a s o - c a l l e d " r e l i a n c e i n t e r e s t " . In o t h e r 
words, to make Defendants whole they should be reimbursed for any 
l o s s e s caused by r e l i a n c e upon t h e l e a s e c o n t r a c t e n t e r e d i n t o 
wi th P l a i n t i f f s . 
In t h i s connect ion , t h e r e was tes t imony t h a t s p e c i a l s i x -
s • H 
Davi.°. • * . ! _ i_ • Depai * i < nt 
MINUTE ENTRY 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS 
Plaintiffs, » 873000114 
vs. Date 12-27-88 
HTAN WARREN, <p* * a 1 . 
Defendants 
* J i idge b o a n 
MATTER: DECISION ON MATTER TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT 
This case was tried August: 15 and the issues were found in favor 
of defendants on their counterclaim. The Court took under 
advisement the question of damages and asked the parties for 
briefs as to tl: :i.e proper measure. The last brief was filed 
September 23. Since then, at every available opportunity, the 
Court has been seeking to find the rule governing what damages 
are properly awardable. References to "defenda.nt" mean 
d ef e nd ant Warr en. 
Many cases ho 1 d that the proper ineasure of damages is the 
difference between the value of the property with the lease and 
its value without the lease. Others say it's the difference 
between the lease rent and the fair market (rental) value 
through the period of the lease plus any other consequential 
damages caused by the breach. Some cases state it in more 
general terms, saying it's the amount it takes to place the 
owner in x h* position lie would have occupied had ti le breach not 
occurted. This latter statement more closely expresses the 
general philosophy of damages followed in our law. The problem 
comes in applying it to the speci rie facts i n hand, i , e , 
r e d UP- :" . - - j i i . . i ^,,,,
 f r, ^ 
Three cases are espocL.ii ; . hoipfu; i n the "restore to same 
no;" - t i on " I D -r oa--1- : 
Ruston v. Centennial Real Es ta te o 7 '•••" ~~ . i r ^ ~ ~ 1 i , 
r ""* - ^ .-)<\ f * ' ) o r p ^ 
Fann : / • lod i <-: •. "< u - i •: i . ; M I S t a t e Dept. o f S o c i a l . A 1 
H e a l • ,-i <WD, I - • V. 1 • " M <1 r^ 
£ c h n - i k i p \ . • . > -i ..-. i - o . ] • • •: 6 0 3 
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What they boil dowi i to is , wi len a tei iai it breaches , tl le owner 1 las 
a duty to take steps to mitigate damages and lease to another 
tenant as soon as is reasonably possible. In order to do that, 
the owner usual ly must remodel and prepare the premises to the 
desire of the new tenant. He is entitled to be reimbursed for 
expenses incurred to the extent that they are expenses of 
mitigation and not capital improvements which are J i keJ y to 1 >e 
beneficial beyond the term of the new tenant. 
The f I, x - u p e x p e i i s < • » i • d I : o b y d e f e i I d a i 11: (11 i e o w i i e r ) a it i 3 
his witness totaled $1/. ,649,32. There was no testimony 
specifying whether a particular expense was mi tigation or 
capital improvement. From an analysis of them, as to amoui if: ai id 
kind, the Court concludes that approximately 50% of them were 
for the particular tenant, and the other half usable for any 
tenant. Applying that to the testimony, defendant i s ent:i t] <-
to reimbursement of $6,325 (rounded). 
Additionally, defenda 
$250, for April, $790 
$1224 . Plaintiff i s 
rent and that leaves 
$724. Evidence of at 
$1,435, an amount the 
the subject matter an 
experience of counsel 
totaled they reach $8 
defendant will receiv 
24 months remaining o 
nt is ei it it led to rei it for par t of Marcl i,. 
, and for one week in May, $184, a total of 
enti tied to a credit of $500 i n prepaid 
net rent due defendant in the amount of 
torney fees for defendant was in tl le sum ol 
Court fi nds to be reasonable in li ght; of 
d nature of the litigation, and the 
on both sides. When those sums are 
,484. 11 is pertinent to note a1so that 
e increased rent from the new tenant in the 
n plaintiffs1 terin amounting to $5 , 040 . 
The Court grants judgment for $8,484 plus court costs i^ 
defendant on his counter claim, and since a set-off has .-* j r * 
been accorded plaintiffs, finds in favor of defendant ana 
against p1aintiffs oI i p1ai ntiffs' compla int. 
, J i ldge 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN, #3314 
VANDERLINDEN & COLTON 
Attorneys at Law 
360 South State, Suite 3 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Telephone: 801-776-0533 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
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TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STAN WARREN, an individual 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY a partnership, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF COSTS 
Civil No. 873000114 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
The affiant being duly sworn deposes and states as follows: 
1. That he is the attorney in the above entitled action. 
2. That he expended total costs of $5.00 as filing fees in 
the above entitled matter. 
DATED this >V day of January, 19 
C. VANDERLINDEN 
Attorney for Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND ACKNOWLEDGED to before me this 30 day of 
January, 1989. 
ie/Ktrt* 
NOTARY fUBLIC^ J_ 
Residing In: &$& 
My Commission E^Ki 
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STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN, #3314 
VANDERLINDEN & COLTON 
Attorneys at Law 
360 South State, Suite 3 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Telephone: 801-77 6-0533 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STAN WARREN, an individual 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY a partnership, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 873000114 
The above entitled matter having come on for trial on the 
15th day of August, 1988. The Plaintiffs were present and 
represented by Michael F. Olmstead. The Defendants were also 
present and represented by Steven C. Vanderlinden. The Court 
having heard testimony by both parties and the Court having 
taken the matter under advisement and each party having 
submitted briefs in support of the positions and the Court 
having occasion to review the testimony and the briefs of the 
parties and good cause appearing hereby ORDERS, ADJUGDES AND 
DECREES as follows: 
1. Defendant is granted Judgment against Plaintiff jointly 
and severally in the amount of $6,325.00 plus attorney fees of 
$1,435.00, plus Court costs of $5.00 for a total of $8,489.00, 
plus interest as allowed by law from the date of Judgment. 
DATED t h i s \0 day of F e b r u a r y , 2r989 
\L 
K. ROGER 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
d 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD #2455 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone No. 621-7613 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, ] 
Plaintiffs / Appellants, ] 
vs. ] 
STAN WARREN, an individual, ! 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY, a partnership, ] 
Defendants / Respondents, ] 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 873000114 
NOTICE is hereby given that TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, 
Plaintiffs above named, hereby appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals of the State of Utah, from the whole and entire Judgment 
of this Court made and entered in this action on February 10, 
1989. 
DATED this / day of March, 1989. 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
MAR 9 1989 
Clerk, lay.on Circuit" CourT~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the X day of March, 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL 
postage pre-paid, to: STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN, Attorney for 
Defendants/Respondents, 360 South State, Suite 3, Clearfield, 
Utah 84015. 
Ida?/ yftAmy 
Secretary ^ 
rfuttt I A M N U Uh UUHPURATE SURETY Bond No. 10H952 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
2nd Circuit Court (Layton) HQURT 
DAVIS COUNTY Mft 873000114 
Tom Hooker & Sandy Thomas Plaintiff. 
tan Warren, an individual, and Property 
onsultants Realty, a partnership 
Defendant _ 
Undertaking 
• On Attachment 
• On Garnishment 
O O n Claim and Delivery 
DO Cost on Appeal 
WHFRFAS.thp PLAINTIFFS 
Jesires to give an undertaking COST ON APPEAL 
as provided to be given in Section '^ ^ 
of the. UTAH .Code Annotated. 
NOW. THEREFORE, the undersigned Surety, the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
surety company authorized to act as surety on bonds and undertakings in the State of UTAH 
joes hereby obligate itself to the said DEFENDANTS 
n the sum of Three Hundred and NO/100-
Dated March 7, 1989 
. under such statutory obligations 
Dollars. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
- N\aLfr$u Surety 
Melvin D. Peel 
Countersigned: 
By 
Attomey-m-lact 
Resident Agent 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
POWER OF ATTORNEY 
}W ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY, a Wisconsin stock insurance corporation, 
ake, constitute and appoint: 
T M . TALBOT, DARLA N. CEVERINGt TERRY H, BUCKNER* MELVIN D. PEEL* EACH OF 
N. UT 
and lawful Attorney(s)-in-Fact, with full power and authority for and on behalf of the company as surety, to execute and deliver and affix 
I of the company thereto (if a seal:J$ required), bonds, undertakings, recognizanc$%or other written obligati^liijn the nature thereof, 
lan ;p^ tif jSonds, bank depositor^/pi^hfe, mortgage deficiency bonds, rri(?rtgage guariarit^ifeonds, guarantees of ;in§tat)ifent paper and note 
/ landslips follows: |f? W * "M M M' .•^£:B^^,., '"-ft ff ' ^S?M---y. 
v#fi r0kN:^0i:imxim Nfts •!$ H mti*;•:: AW%NT NOT ' =|p _ ixclfeoJAN :#;§W®£MATE |-bF§§ 
ipd 0LD R6|UBLIC SU lET t G^M l^NY ;P^ i i ^ i ^ d i i l l of the acts of S $ $ : A t ^ tHS&ii}fes#i^ 
filmed. Thisl&gjM of the board of directors at a"'|||>c!^Metiiiai:held on February 18,.|$i&. 
ver of Attorney Us signed and sealed by ftoimili'Srider and by the authority of the fol lo^i% reiStitions adopted by i ^ l bo i r d of 
; of the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY oh February 18,1982. 
JOLVED that the president, any vice-president, or assistant vice-president in conjunction with the secretary or any assistant secretary, 
appoint attorneys-in-fact or agents with authority as defined or limited in the instrument evidencing the appointment in each case, 
3nd on behalf of the company to execute and deliver and affix the seal of the company to bonds, undertakings, recognizances, and 
ityshippbligations of all kinds;
 :atf$§#id officers may remove any suf^jattorney^in-f^ct or agent and revok|;Sny power of attorney 
io^ly Qf&pted to such personal fi?7'''Ill 
)Lt|D FURTHER i&t Sfiy ^ ^0n6e^i^rec^^^.orv^\ysh\p obligatici::shali:& vafif anglj indi^ g |:;whe^|iBn^;iy J i j ^ ^ t|£s£tet9nt ^ ice-president, $M attfe&te4|^ nd ,|ped ; (if ^ a ^ i ^ r e f l i j ^ d ) ! ! ' aii||ecf|tary|i)r £s|jstarit; 
.:S:%ecretery;:||rjf !"% 9-iff I I Bl fti rS S < % :'&^M Mf I f l l f I f l l f - f ; J t I I I I S !••' 
:
 wlpi signlibyj the pre$j(jent;a%yic^fesidiit dr-ias^stan i^ce-president, sedli^grx^siistant |fccref|ty, ancj;|bu|irsj|^ ;ptl s^d^^^MM 
£lecjuired) b l ^ d u l f ^ ,.J?0: . ";:::ifflP;::' 
) when duly existed arid se£l&J (if a seal be reqired^b^dp dr more attorneys-in-fact or agents pursuant:ip;^ nd: wigpfthe limits of the aMnty^yi^tced 
, by the power of attorney issued by the company to sOcti person or ^mzm;-
LVED FURTHER that the signature of any authorized officer and the seal of the company may be affixed by facsimile to any power of attorney or certification 
)f authorizing the execution and delivery of any bond, undertaking, recognizance, or other suretyship obligations of the company; and such signature and seal 
so used shall have the same force and effect as though manually affixed. 
TTNESS WHEREOF, OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY has caused these presents to be signed by its proper officer, and its 
i seal to be affixed this 3RD day of AUGUST , 19 BQ , 
^*»»*?\ 0 L D REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
^ ' fa SEAL!?! 
\ o 
Asst. Secretary fl \ * ^ *" l President 
" WISCONSIN, COUNTY OF WAUKESHA - SS 
s 3RD day of AUGUST , 19 86 *., . personally came before me, DONALD L BOWEN _ 
31C1A A. MORTAG to me known to be the individuals and officers of the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY who executed the 
rument, and they each acknowledged the execution of the same, and being by me duly sworn, did severally depose and say; that 
he said officers of the corporation aforesaid, and that the seal affixed to the above instrument is the seal of the corporation, and 
corporate seal and their signatures as such officers were duly affixed and subscribed to the said instrument by the authority of 
of directors of said corporation. 
^ Mr\tnr\/ Pi ihiK^ , • *. , , Notary ublic 
*>.%***$" My commission expires: — 
VTE 
indersigned, assistant secretary of the OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY, a Wisconsin corporation, CERTIFY that the fore-
attached power of attorney remains in full force and has not been revoked; and furthermore, that the Resolutions of the board 
5 set forth in the Power of Attorney, are now in force. 
;
 co*'0«4r£ \ O -^
'
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 ! ! ' ' SEAL i l l S i 3 n e d a n d sea le-d a t t h e c i t y o f Brookfield, Wl this 7 th day of March 19 J39_ 
' " " / •HMMIMtt^ 
-88) IT Assistant Secretary 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD #2455 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone No. 621-7613 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, 
Plaintiffs / Appellants, 
vs. 
STAN WARREN, an individual, 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY, a partnership, 
Defendants / Respondents, 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules of the UCOA, you are 
hereby requested to prepare, certify and transmit to the Court of 
Appeals of the State of Utah, with reference to the Notice of 
Appeal heretofore filed by the Plaintiffs in the above cause, a 
transcript of the entire record in the above cause, prepared and 
transmitted as required by law and the rules of said court. 
DATED this _ £ _ day of March, 1989. 
MICHflEU FTOLMSTEAD 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
P f! P pp. 
PV 1.)
 r v
1 
DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
Civil No. 873000114 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ( day of March, 1989, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, DESIGNATION 
OF RECORD ON APPEAL, postage pre-paid, to the following: STEVEN 
C. VANDERLINDEN, Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, 360 South 
State, Suite 3, Clearfield, Utah 84015; and UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, 
400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Secretary 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD #2455 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone No. 621-7613 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, 
Plaintiffs / Appellants, 
vs. 
STAN WARREN, an individual, 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY, a partnership, 
Defendants / Respondents, 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
Pursuant to Rule 11(e) of the Rules of the UCOA, Appellants 
request a transcript of the recorded proceedings, pre-trial and 
trial, in the above-captioned matter. 
DATED this 7 day of March, 1989. 
MICHAEL, F. OLMSTEAD 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
F 1 1 . P p\ 
M] 1 ) M:} 
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT 
Civil No. 873000114 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the _7 day of March, 1989, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, REQUEST FOR 
TRANSCRIPT, postage pre-paid, to the following: STEVEN C. 
VANDERLIHDEN, Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, 360 South 
State, Suite 3, Clearifeld, Utah 84015; and UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102. 
cretary 
MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD #2455 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone No. 621-7613 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, ] 
Plaintiffs / Appellants, ] 
vs. ] 
STAN WARREN, an individual, ] 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY, a partnership, ] 
Defendants / Respondents, ] 
) PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 873000114 
TO 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and object to proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law as submitted by Defendants with a 
certificate of mailing dated March 6, 1989. 
Plaintiff's objections are predicated upon: 
1. The submission was not made within 15 days of the 
ruling (memorandum decision) of the Court dated December 28, 
1988, as required by Rule 2.9(a) of the Rules of Practice of 
District and Circuit Courts. 
2. Defendants waived the right to submit formal Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law by submitting a Judgment signed 
and entered by the Court on or about February 10, 1989. In 
effect, the Defendants relied upon the memorandum decision as 
constituting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that support 
the Judgment dated February 10, 1989. 
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3. Defendants submission, if considered to be a motion to 
amend or make additional findings under Rule 52(b) URCP, is 
defective in that they were not submitted within 10 days of the 
Judgment as required by Rule 52(b). 
4. Plaintiffs have filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals on the record, exclusive of the proposed 
and submitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now 
submitted by Defendants. 
DATED this J _ day of March, 1989. 
MICVAEL F? OLMSTEAD 
A t t o r n e y fo r P l a i n t i f f s / A p p e l l a n t s 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e tf day of M a r c h , 1989 , I 
m a i l e d a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, p o s t a g e 
p r e - p a i d , t o : STEVEN C. V ANDERLINDEN, A t t o r n e y f o r 
D e f e n d a n t s / R e s p o n d e n t s , 360 S o u t h S t a t e , S u i t e 3 , C l e a r f i e l d , 
Utah 84015. 
Secretary ~^ 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN, #3314 
VANDERLINDEN & COLTON 
Attorneys at Law 
360 South State, Suite 3 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Telephone: 801-776-0533 
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SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
TOM HOOKER and SANDY THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STAN WARREN, an individual 
and PROPERTY CONSULTANTS 
REALTY a partnership, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 873000114 
The above entitled matter having come on for trial on the 
15th day of August, 1988. The Plaintiffs were present and 
represented by Michael F. Olmstead. The Defendants were also 
present and represented by Steven C. Vanderlinden. The court 
having heard testimony by both parties and the Court having 
taken the matter under advisement and each party having 
submitted briefs in support of their positions and the Court 
having reviewed the testimony and the briefs of each party 
hereby enters it's: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Defendants are residents of Davis County and 
the lease in question was over real property located in Davis 
County, Utah. 
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Conclusions of Law 
2. That the parties entered into a lease agreement on 
April 9, 1986 at $750.00 per month to lease units 2 and 3 at 12 
South Main, Layton Utah for the 1st year and $790.00 per month 
for years 2 and 3 of the lease. 
3. That Plaintiff tenants breached said lease agreement 
in March of 1987, with Defendants, by vacating the premises. 
4. That Defendants spent $12,649.32 to fix up the real 
property previously leased by Plaintiff's. 
5. That Plaintiffs failed to pay rent in March of 
$250.00, April $790.00 and one week in May for $184.00. 
6. That Plaintiff's had prepaid $500.00 in rent. 
7. That the lease agreement specified Defendants could 
recover attorney's fees and Court costs. 
8. That Defendants did in fact hire an attorney in the 
above matter. 
9. That 50% of Defendants' improvements were for general 
improvement of the premises or another tenant and not expended 
as a result of the lease between the parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the above 
entitled action. 
2. Defendant is entitled to and is hereby awarded a 
judgment of $8,489.00 computed as follows: 
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TO: MICHAEL Oi.MSTEAD 
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OGDEN. UTAH ft .14 01 
You are hereby notified ifiaf pursuant t. o Rule 2.a you have 
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document. 
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was thinking there's about 57, 60 yards of carpet in 
there. But I don't really, you know, know. I am guessing. 
Q You don't know how much the carpet was a 
square foot or a square yard? 
A I don't recall that. 
Q Do you know how much the carpet -- how much 
you paid for the carpet you took out, the so-called damaged 
carpet? 
A It was $1600 or $1800 for the carpet, and 
roughly the same for installation. 
Q So if this carpet is $2152 and their carpet 
was $1600 or $1800, it would be either an upgrade or an 
increase in price of $300 to $500, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q The installation cost was about the same? 
A About the same. 
Q You do have invoices? 
A I know I've got them somewhere. 
Q If the Court required them, and I don't know 
that the Court will, could you provide thoise? 
A You bet I can. 
MR. VANDERLINUEN: Well, let's leave that up 
to the Judge. I am offering the checks. I don't think he 
has the right to require him to get invoices. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure I have anything to 
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which of the two men committed the crime, of stock in corporation. The Third District 
Upon the submission of the matter, the trial Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, 
court stated: J., found for wife, and husband appealed. 
All right. I do not believe that an The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that 
innocent man is being punished, J do not judgment that former husband was in con-
believe there's been a miscarriage of jus- tempt of court and sentence of 30 days 
tice, and the petition for a writ of corum thereon could not be sustained, since there 
nobis is denied. were no adequate written findings or judg-
When the trial judge has made his find- m e n t i n memorandum decision by trial 
ings, they are entitled to a presumption of c o u r t t h a t a f t e r e n t l 7 o f d i v o r c e decree> o r 
correctness, and on appeal the evidence is to subsequent order thereon, husband had 
be surveyed in the light most favorable to o w n e d s t o c k in question and willfully failed 
sustain them. If there is any reasonable a n d refused to transfer it. 
basis to sustain the judgment of the trial Judgment and sentence vacated, 
court, it will be affirmed.3 
[2] The evidence overwhelmingly sup-
ports the holding of the trial court, and the 
judgment is therefore affirmed. No costs 
are awarded. 
CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, J J , 
concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in result. 
( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM} 
June Marlene THOMAS, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Harry Edward THOMAS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14503. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 23, 1977. 
Former wife sought to have former 
husband held in contempt of court for fad-
ure to comply with divorce decree in which 
he was ordered to deliver to her ten shares 
1. Contempt s=>61(6) 
Trial e=> 393(3) 
Written findings are necessary to sup-
port judgment, including a contempt judg-
ment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 52(a). 
2. Contempt ^61(6) 
Trial <3=>404(1) 
Trial judge's memorandum decision can 
be regarded as findings of fact supporting 
judgment, including contempt judgment, to 
the extent findings are recited therein. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 52(a). 
3. Contempt ^60(1) 
Where there is a judgment that party 
do an act, such as to deliver stock or deed, 
which judgment stands unattacked, it is 
presumed that party has ability to perform 
and that complainant makes prima facie 
case of contempt by showing failure to com-
ply with judgment. 
4. Contempt <s=>60(l) 
Where there is evidence concerning jus-
tification for failure of party to do act, such 
as to deliver stock or deed, after judgment 
so ordering, ultimate burden of proving 
that party charged is in contempt is on 
complainant. 
5. Contempt o=25, 70 
Although mere failure to pay debt or 
meet obligation is not punishable by impris-
3. Id.; Leithcad v. Adair, 10 Utah 2d 282, 35l P.2d 956 (1960); Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 
381, 275 P.2d 680 (1954). 
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onment, when proper order or judgment 
has been made, one who stands in willful 
defiance or disobedience thereof may be 
found in contempt of court and punished by 
imprisonment. Const, art. 1, § 16. 
6. Contempt e=*60(3) 
In order to justify finding of contempt 
and imposition of jail sentence, it must ap-
pear by clear and convincing proof that 
party knew what was required of him, had 
ability to comply, and willfully and know-
ingly failed and refused to do so. 
7. Di/orce <3=>269(13) 
Judgment that former husband was in 
contempt of court for failure to comply 
with divorce decree in which he was or-
dered to deliver to former wife ten shares 
of stock in corporation, and sentence of 30 
days thereon, could not be sustained, since 
there were no adequate written findings or 
judgment in memorandum decision by trial 
court that after entry of divorce decree, or 
subsequent order thereon, husband had 
owned stock in question and willfully failed 
and refused to transfer it. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 52(a). 
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Jay D. Edmonds, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Defendant, Harry Edward Thomas, ap-
peals from an order sentencing him to 30 
days in jail for contempt of court for failure 
to comply with a divorce decree in which he 
was ordered to deliver to Plaintiff, June 
Marlene Thomas, ten shares of stock in Ute 
Distributing Company. 
The decree was entered April 23, 1970. 
Among a number of things, not material 
here, defendant was ordered to deliver to 
plaintiff the aforementioned stock. On 
June 26,1974, the defendant was before the 
court in response to an order to show cause 
why he had not delivered the stock. The 
trial judge took the matter under advise-
ment. On July 12, 1974, there was recorded 
a minute entry of his decision that "the 
court concludes plaintiff is entitled to an 
order ordering defendant to deliver to her 
within 10 days from the date of the order 
herein 10 shares of stock of Ute Distribut-
ing Company." This was implemented by 
written Findings of Fact and Judgment 
signed and entered on January 3, 197"). 
Again on January 23, 1976, the defendant 
was before another division of the district 
court in response to a similarly based order 
to show cause. It was stipulated that the 
stock had not been delivered. Defendant 
moved to dismiss on the ground that the 
plaintiff had failed to show that he had the 
ability and wilfully failed to deliver the 
stock. The court heard testimony on that 
day and also on January 30, 1976, concern-
ing various transfers of stock of three cor-
porations, Ute, Titan, and Eagle, which 
seem to be owned by the defendant's fami-
At the conclusion of the testimony, the 
court took the matter under advisement. 
In a memorandum decision dated February 
9,1976, the judge stated: "Defendant's own 
lack of recollection of facts relating to the 
foregoing matters made it difficult to as-
certain reasons for the transfers related or 
his connections therewith, but it is apparent 
that he has not complied with the court's 
order of January 3, 1975, and he has failed 
to satisfy me that he is not in contempt of 
this court. I thus find that he is in con-
tempt of court . . . ." There are no 
further findings of fact, conclusion of law 
or written order or judgment in the record, 
except a minute entry of March 2, 19 < 6. 
that: the court orders "defendant to serve 
30 days in jail." 
In addition to the defendant's above-stat-
ed contention that it is not shown that he 
had the ability and wilfully refused to de-
liver the stock, the defendant attacks the 
jail sentence imposed upon him on the 
ground that it is without a foundation in 
written findings and judgment. 
[1,2] The soundness of defendant's con-
tention that there must be written findings 
and judgment relating to such a contempt 
THOMAS v 
Cite as 569 
is not to be questioned.1 However, we also 
agree with the plaintiffs rejoinder that the 
trial judge's memorandum decision can be 
regarded as findings of fact.2 But this is of 
course limited to such findings as are recit-
ed therein. 
[3,4] It is true, as plaintiff contends, 
that where there is a judgment that a party 
do an act, such as to deliver stock or a deed, 
which judgment stands unattacked, it is 
presumed that the party has the ability to 
perform;3 and that a complainant makes a 
prima facie case of contempt by showing 
failure to comply with the judgment. But 
where there is evidence concerning justifi-
cation for the failure, the ultimate burden 
of proving that the party charged is in 
contempt is on the complainant.4 In that 
regard there are certain principles concern-
ing contempt which should be considered. 
[5] Under what we regard as a view 
more enlightened than prevailed in former 
times, the mere failure to pay a debt or 
meet an obligation is not punishable by 
imprisonment.5 However, when a proper 
order or judgment has been made, one who 
stands in wilful defiance or disobedience 
thereof may be found in contempt of court 
and punished by imprisonment. This is a 
necessary power of the court in order to 
enforce its orders and judgments. Such 
procedure provides an effective aid in ad-
ministering justice by giving effect to the 
judgment; and it has the adjunctive pur-
poses of punishing a contumacious offender, 
and of wrarning others not to so offend. 
[6] Although technically civil in nature, 
the finding of a person in contempt and 
sentencing him to jail is of very serious 
consequence to the person involved, some-
what akin to a criminal penalty. It is for 
1. That written findings are necessary to sup-
port a judgment, see Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P.; and 
as to contempt see Parish v. McConkie, 84 
Utah 396, 35 P.2d JOOJ. 
2. Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 
2d 344, 294 P.2d 689; Life Savers Corp. v. 
Curtis Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4 (C.A.7, 1950). 
3. See 17 C.J.S. Contempt Sec. 84(2). 
. THOMAS Utah H 2 1 
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this reason that such a severe measure is 
not permissible unless a party has manifest-
ed such obstinacy in disobedience of the 
court order that it is necessary to accom-
plish that which equity and justice demand. 
Accordingly, in order to justify a finding of 
contempt and the imposition of a jail sen-
tence, it must appear by clear and convinc-
ing proof that: (1), the party knew what 
was required of him; (2), that he had the 
ability to comply; and (3), that he wilfully 
and knowingly failed and refused to do so.6 
The memorandum decision above re-
ferred to contains a somewhat extensive 
exposition: concerning stock transfers be-
tween the defendant and three corporations 
(Ute, Titan, Eagle) in which he was in-
volved; the position of his daughter as sec-
retary of Ute Distributing, who at times 
also acted on behalf of Titan and Eagle; 
and the ownership in Ute of defendant's 
two half brothers. One of the significant 
recitals therein is that "these certificates 
[representing the ten shares of stock in Ute 
Distributing Company In question here] 
were canceled on September 22, 1969, and a 
new certificate for 23 shares was issued in 
defendant's name as custodian for his two 
minor sons by a previous marriage. . ." 
[7] It is not spelled out that he thus 
became trustee of the stock, with the bene-
ficial interest therein vested in the sons, but 
that seems to be the fair import of that 
recital. It is significant to note that this 
occurred in September of 1969 whereas the 
divorce was not granted until April of 1970; 
and thus the defendant would have been 
divested of the stock in question before the 
divorce decree and the subsequent order 
thereon, hereinabove referred to. More 
4. 17 C.J.S. Contempt Sec. 84(2), cases cited at 
n. 66. 
5. S?c. 16, Art. }, Utah Const, provides that 
'There shall be no imprisonment for debt 
6. 17 C.J.S. Contempt 84(4) and cases cited at n. 
94; and see Powers v. Taylor. 14 Utah 2d 118, 
378 P.2d 519, wherein we used the phrase 
"clear and satisfactory" proof. 
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specifically, there is no express recital 
therein that after those dates the defendant 
had the stock, nor that he had the ability to 
transfer them to the plaintiff, nor that he 
wilfully failed and refused to do so. Ac-
cordingly, whatever else may be said about 
the memorandum decision being regarded 
as findings, it cannot be concluded that 
there is any clear and satisfactory showing 
that after the entry of the divorce decree, 
or the subsequent order thereon, the de-
fendant had owned the stock in question 
and wilfully failed and refused to transfer 
them. What has just been said about the 
insufficiency of findings is equally true as 
to the lack of a written judgment based 
thereon. 
We deem it important to observe that 
what has been said herein relates only to 
the issue of the defendant's alleged con-
tempt and the jail sentence thereon. It is 
not to be understood as relieving the de-
fendant from the duty imposed upon him of 
delivering the stock to plaintiff, or as de-
priving the plaintiff of her entitlement to 
the stock, or to any damages she may have 
suffered by the defendant's failure to deliv-
er it in accordance with the divorce decree. 
On the basis of what has been said here-
in, it is our conclusion that because there 
are no adequate written findings or judg-
ment, the judgment that the defendant is in 
contempt and the sentence of 30 days there-
on cannot be sustained; and they are there-
fore vacated. No costs awarded. 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
rw 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM) 
J. A. MOLLERUP, Plaintiff, 
D. Richard Moench, Assignee of 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
STORAGE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, 
a Utah Corporation, Robert T. Martin, 
Ernestina M. Martin, The United States 
of America, Hamilton Fan and Blower 
Company and Village Carpet Mills, Inc., 
Defendants and Respondents, 
John C. Green, Trustee in Bankruptcy of 
Robert T. Martin, Respondent. 
Nos. 14876 and 14947. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 26, 1977. 
Successful bidder at sheriff's sale of 
real property appealed from two orders of 
the District Court, Salt Lake County, Mar-
cellus K. Snow, J., which extended the lime 
for redemption after foreclosure. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, J., held that because the 
party who sought and obtained an exten-
sion of the redemption period was in no 
position to redeem and was merely attempt-
ing to sell the right of redemption, the 
extensions granted were not based on ade-
quate cause and amounted to an abuse of 
discretion. 
Orders reversed. 
1. Mortgages <3=»592 
The right of redemption is not an equi-
table right created or regulated by princi-
ples of equity but rather is a creature of 
statute and depends entirely on the provi-
sions of the statute creating the right 
U.C.A.1953, 78-37-6. 
2. Mortgages <3=>599(1) 
A court, sitting in equity, may in ap-
propriate instances extend the time for re-
demption after foreclosure on real property 
U.C.A.1953, 78-37 6; Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rules 6(b), 69(fX3). 
3. Mortgages <3=*599(1) 
Bankruptcy after foreclosure and sale 
of real property does not extend the time 
for redemption and if the bankrupt or nis 
SPRAGUE v. BOYLES 
Cite fts 29' 
Walter W. SPRAGUE and U. S. Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
BOYLES BROS. DRILLING CO., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 8351. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Feb. 29, 195G. 
Action by general contractor and its 
surety against subcontractor for breach of 
contract by which subcontractor agreed 
to break rock into proper size for use by 
general contractor in construction of a 
levee. The Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Martin M. Larson, J., 
entered judgment for general contractor 
and its surety, and subcontractor appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that 
evidence was not sufficient to establish that 
subcontractor's breach led to increased 
haulage costs or to increase in cost of 
furnishing compressed air. 
Judgment reduced, and as reduced, 
affirmed. 
Henriod, J., dissented in par t 
I. Abatement and Revival <£=8(2) 
Judgment €=585(5) 
Regardless whether there was a dis-
missal in prior action by general contractor 
and his surety against subcontractor, gen-
eral contractor and surety would not be 
foreclosed from instituting subsequent ac-
tion against subcontractor, in view of fact 
that issue, which was pleaded in second 
action, and which was whether subcon-
tractor was directly liable to general con-
tractor and, by subrogation, to general con-
tractor's surety, was not litigated nor plead-
ed in the prior action and that plaintiff in 
subsequent action supplied new and addi-
tional facts which were not before the 
c
°urt in prior action.1 
*• State v. Calif. Parkins Corp., 10."> Utah 
301, 145 P.2il 7M; Frnmfoen v. Piute 
Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 10G Utah I>7S, 
148 P.2d 804. 
294 P.2d—44 
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2. Appeal and Error C=>93l(l) 
In reviewing trial court's findings ad-
verse to defendant, plaintiff is entitled to 
have the Supreme Court consider all evi-
dence and every fair inference fairly to be 
derived therefrom in light most favorable 
to plaintiff whether the action be one on 
contract or in tort.2 
3. Contracts €=322(1) 
Where subcontractor withdrew its 
equipment from quarry when not paid 
amount due under contract to break rock 
into proper size for use by general contrac-
tor and thereafter returned its men and 
equipment to the quarry and resumed 
work when such payment was made, pre-
sumption that subcontractor had waived 
any right to rely on such delay in payment 
as excuse for further performance of sub-
contractor was reasonable. 
4. Contracts <3=3303(l) 
Where rock, as broken by subcontrac-
tor, was not properly sized as required by 
contract with general contractor and was 
too large to handle and, therefore, not in 
condition requisite to removal, general con-
tractor's failure to keep quarry cleared of 
rock processed by subcontractor in accord-
ance with contract requirements would not 
constitute an excuse for subcontractor's 
failure to supply rock specified by the con-
tract. 
5. Contracts €=3305(1) 
Fact that contractor and subcontractor 
executed subcontract, which required con-
tractor to furnish subcontractor with suffi-
cient compressed air to operate drills ef-
ficiently, after there had occurred a sub-
stantial portion of period of compressed 
air deficiency complained of by subcontrac-
tor indicated that such failure was not of 
grave concern to subcontractor, and, there-
fore, subcontractor would be held to have 
waived such failure and would not be heard 
to complain of it. 
2. P.o<k v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127. 2G2 
P.lM 7G0; Culler Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 
3 I'tuh 2d 107, 279 P.2d 700. 
590 Ctah 294 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
6. Appeal and Error C^7I7 
In determining whether trial court had 
made certain finding, Supreme Quirt could 
consider the m< morandum decision and the 
findings together. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
rule 52(a), "28 U S . C A ; Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 52(a). 
7. Contracts 0 3 5 4 
In action b> general contractor and its 
surety for breach of contract by which sub-
contractor agreed to break rock into prop-
er size for use by general contractor in 
construction of a levee, trial court's memo-
randum decision that general contractor's 
duties included obligation to furnish suffi-
cient air to efficiently operate subcontrac-
tor's drills and his finding that general con-
tractor performed his part of the contract 
were sufficient to manifest that trial court 
had found that general contractor had met 
his obligation to furnish compressed air. 
Fed Rules Civ.Proc. rule 52(a), 28 U.S. 
C.A.; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 52(a). 
8. Contracts <3=>32J(I) 
Where one party to contract, has failed 
or refused to perform some obligation un-
der it, contract may still remain in force 
and, even though it does, wronged party 
may be excused from further performance 
and recover for loss occasioned to him. 
9. Contracts <§^354 
In action by general contractor and 
its surety against subcontractor for breach 
of contract by which subcontractor agreed 
to break rock into proper size for use by 
general contractor in construction of a 
levee, fact that trial court used term "re-
scission" in its findings could not defeat 
judgment adverse to subcontractor on 
ground that use of such term showed appli-
cation of wrong theory of law, in view of 
other findings, including one that there 
had been a breach by subcontractor and that 
damages flowed therefrom. 
10. Evidence C=I77 
Where original entries, documents, or 
other data are so numerous, complex, or 
cumbersome that they cannot be conven-
iently examined by fact trier or showing 
«• * 
is made that it would rraternlK- a:f* 
and parties m anah/tng such "iratcVal 
competent person, who has made ^ v -
tion of such items, may present *uch 
dence, provided that the evidence •* «; 
to ha\e been de\ eloped from rccor S 
-*** 
or documents whobe competent has >»** 
established, that the records are a ^ u i ^ 
for examination by opposing parties, w 
that witness is subjected to crosa-cxaaiin-
tion concerning such evidence. 
11. Evidence 0=177 
In action by general contractor in4 g* 
surety for breach of contract b\ wri.r'r. **&, 
contractor agreed to break rock into prep** 
size for use by general contractor :n oa*. 
struction of levee, admission of «t*i 
sheets which were prepared by z~nr~it 
contractor's bookkeeper and wlrch ca&» 
tained a compilation of figures and expea* 
es incurred by general contractor after >efe» 
contractor had pulled out of the job «*» 
not error, even though sheets were ** 
original entries made concurrent \\::h tibr 
transaction, in view of fact that bookXccpcs 
testified to manner of keeping booVs. c*» 
plained the exhibits and underlying dcx> 
and was there for cross-examination. 
12. Damages O=»220 
In action for breach of subcontract, 
trial court's finding that, by breach of eno* 
tract, general contractor suffered dam*cr» 
in amount necessarily expended to perfcm 
things required by contract to be perfonae* 
by subcontractor over and above all creott 
given by general contractor to subcontract 
tor was sufficient to support judgnx* 
awarding additional costs to general cam* 
tractor for operations after subcontract* 
had declined to finish performance.3 
13. Damages 0=120(2) 
Upon subcontractor's breach or coo-
tract by which subcontractor agreed » 
break rock into proper size for use by g*a» 
eral contractor in constructing 1**"* 
amount general contractor had to expert <* 
rock over and above the 48 cents per ton be 
would have had to pay subcontractor uinkf 
the contract was correct measure ot o 
ages, provided general contractor procu 
3. Duszins v. Colby, 45 Utah 335, 145 P. 1042. 
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additional rock in the most economical provided timely notice was given. Com 
^y available. 
| t Damages <S=>45 
General contractor's right to recover, 
gainst subcontractor, who had breached 
• contract, reimbursement for penalty suf-
fered iov contractor's failure to complete 
construction of levee within time set in 
jrim' contract would not be precluded by 
pensation was set at 48 cents for each ton 
of rock broken to size. Modifications in 
the prime contract resulted in a requirement 
to supply 15,400 tons of rock, which Boyles 
admittedly did not complete. 
Sprague sued Boyles for damages result-
ing from the lattcr's failure to perform 
their contract and his consequent inability 
bet that general contractor had right to to perform his prime contract on time. 
w t on any additional force required to Boyles set up the defense that they were 
foiish contract on time, in absence of show- justified in failure to fully perform because 
. that general contractor reasonably could of certain claimed breaches by Sprague, and 
^ve done so but refused.4 U- S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., who later 
undertook to perform as bondsman for 
15, Damages €=>I9I Sprague. (Their interests being the same, 
In action by general contractor and its 
we will refer to them as Spracrue.) Boyles 
^ety for breach of contract by which
 a l s Q c o u n t c r d a i m e d f o r d a m a g , , f o r s u c h 
.^contractor agreed^ tobreak rock into
 b r e a c h e s a n d f o r m o n e y a l l e g e d l v d u e t h e m 
for rock they had broken. The trial court 
found in favor of Sprague, awarding judg-
ment for the failure to perform plus rea-
nctor's breach led to increased_ haulage
 s o n a b , e a t t o r n e y - s f e e s a s p r o v i d e d i n t h e 
contract; and also rejected Boyles* coun-
•ropcr size for use by general contractor 
0 construction of a levee, evidence was 
** sufficient to establish that subcon-
<D$ts or to increase in cost of furnishing 
compressed air. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Grar.t Macfarlane, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
i~".!!ant. 
Elliott \V. Evans, Salt Lake City, for re-
tinae r.ts. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Appeal from a judgment awarding 
Scrapie and his surety damages for breach 
«: contract in which Boyles Bros, agreed 
to break rock into proper size for use by 
Sprague in constructing a levee on the 
knks of the Snake River near Rigby, 
luho. 
terclaim. 
Boyles' first attack on the judgment is 
that the present action should have been 
abated because another suit based on the 
same facts was pending before the district 
court. On September 22, 1952, plaintiffs' 
counsel commenced a civil action in the 
Third Judicial District Court on behalf of 
Sprague and U. S. F. & G., as joint plain-
tiffs against Boyles. That complaint was 
framed on the mistaken belief that the U. S. 
F. & G. had bonded Boyles; that Boyles 
had defaulted; that after Bo\les' default 
U. S. F. & G. had performed and thus suf-
fered a loss which it was entitled to recover 
from Boyles. Defendant's answer admitted 
that U. S. F. & G. had bondvd Boyles, 
although this was in error. Plaintiffs' 
-Prague, the general contractor, let a 
•^contract to Boyles by which the latter counsel later discovered that U. S. F. & G. 
•scvrtook to break into sizes of 50 to 350 had bonded Sprague, not Boyles; had per-
K»-nds a minimum of 12,200 tons of native formed the contract for Sprague and was 
**k located in Olsen Quarry, to be done subrogated to Sprague's rights to recover 
^current in time with Sprague's carrying against Boyles. He moved to amend the 
°^ his contract with the Federal Govern- complaint to state a cause of action on this 
e
*nt. Boyles also agreed to furnish any ad- theory. The trial judge refused to allow 
Clonal rock necessary to complete the the amendment or to grant defendant's mo-
contract and any subsequent modifications, tion to dismiss with prejudice. Neither 
4. Russell v. Bothwell. 57 Utnli 3<52. 104 P. 1109. 
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party appealed that action, nor was any-
thing further done in that case. 
Defendant now urges that the present 
suit should be abated because the former 
action is still pending and insists that the 
order refusing to allow the filing of an 
amended complaint in the case is a bar to 
the present action. To sustain this posi-
tion, defendant cites State v. California 
Packing Corp., etc.1 There the District 
Court sustained a demurrer to plaintiffs' 
amended complaint; plaintiff refused to 
plead further and the case was dismissed 
with prejudice. Upon appeal this court af-
firmed. Thereafter the State instituted 
new proceedings and defendant pleaded the 
dismissal of the first action as a bar to 
the second one. Justice Wade, for the 
Court, held that even though plaintiffs 
original action was dismissed with preju-
dice, the State was not barred from main-
taining another action based on the same 
general set of circumstances, because the 
new complaint supplied additional facts and 
stated a new cause of action; the dismissal 
with prejudice was determinative only to 
the extent it determined that the complaint 
attacked by the demurrer did not state a 
cause of action.2 
[1] Here there was no dismissal. But 
even if there had been, plaintiffs would not 
be foreclosed under our holdings from in-
stituting this action. The issue pleaded in 
the second suit—whether Boyles were di-
rectly liable to Sprague (and by subroga-
tion to U. S. F. & G.)—was not litigated, 
nor was the same issue pleaded in the first 
suit. The complaint now supplies new and 
additional facts which were not before the 
Court originally; consequently the rule laid 
down in the California Packing case actu-
ally favors* plaintiffs here. 
Boyles sought to justify their failure to 
supply the rock specified by the contract 
because of several claimed breaches of its 
terms by Sprague, his failure (1) to make 
the progress payment at the time stipulated, 
1. State v. Calif. Packing Corp., 105 Utah 
191, 145 P.2d 784. 
2. This principle was affirmed in Frandsen 
v. Piute Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 106 
Utah 378, 148 P.2d 804. 
(2) to keep the quarry cleared of ^ 
processed by Boyles, and (3) to supply 
pressed air as required by the contrac ^ \ 
[2] It is to be borne in mind tH* k 
reviewing the Court's findings ad\ern 2 
the defendant, the plaintiffs are mx$Aa 
to have us consider all of the ev.-iencc^i 
e\ery fair inference fairly to be 
therefrom in the light most favor 
plaintiffs,3 and this is true in an a c ^ ^ 
contract, as well as in tort.4 
[3] With reference to the iSkmM 
breach number (1) above referred to: k 
appears that on April 20, 1950, Boyin htif 
broken up 12,200 tons of rock and by ftg 
contract terms were entitled to recede 7J* 
of the contract price of 48 cent^ per a* 
or 36 cents per ton therefor. It :s ^ i t 
puted that the payment was not made 6' 
that time, and that Boyles withdrew dtalf 
equipment from the quarry on May |fl^ 
There is evidence that the parties wtftif 
disagreement as to whether Boyles )gt 
broken the rock into proper size, vtedfc 
might well have justified the failure • 
make prompt payment; and further. £gl 
in July the payment was made to Boyltt 
and shortly thereafter they returned Ady 
men and equipment to the quarry iad flK 
sumed work on the contract. L'noer flflfe 
circumstances, it was not unreasonable V 
the trial court to assume that Bo\!es »i i*f 
any right to rely on this delay in ;var 
as excusing further performance. 
[4] The alleged breach number 
listed above relating to the failure to 1 
the quarry clear of processed rock a < 
cordance with the requirement in the ( 
tract that Sprague would remove the 
to "coincide with hauling operations L _, 
not to cause delay," is also answered W, 
Sprague's evidence that the rock w t i ^ 
properly sized and too large to handk, IP* 
hence, not in the condition requisite » ^ 
moval. 
[5] Claimed breach number (3). 
Sprague did not provide sufficient C«^ 
3. Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127. & y | 
2d 760. 
4. Cutler Ass'n v. De Jay Stores. 3 C * 
2d 107, 271) P.2d 700. 
*S 
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-<cd air to operate the drills efficiently done,-"* manifests that the court found that 
is the one on Sprague had met his obligation to furnish 
compressed air. 
-ording t 0 contract terms, 
•hich Boylcs place the greatest emphasis, 
gainst Boylcs' evidence concerning that 
"• dure, there was testimony that a sub-
«-ntial portion of the longest period of 
.vricicnev complained of, that is, between 
December 20, 1949, and February 3, 1950, 
occurred before the contract was formally 
executed by the parties late in January, 
fbis indicates that this so-called failure 
va< not of any grave concern to the Boyles. 
Tnev having signed the contract there-
after, the trial court could reasonably be-
heve that they had waived any such failure 
jnd were in no position to complain of 
tt. There was also the statement of one of 
Bevies' own witnesses that there was suffi-
cient air pressure to operate the drills; 
ar.d other evidence that lack of compres-
«KI, which admittedly occurred at times, 
wis temporary, and such as should reason-
ably be expected to occur on such a job. 
f6. 7] Concerning the matter of supply-
~z compressed air, defendant, Boyles, also 
repute error to the trial court in failing to 
iz<: specifically whether Sprague supplied 
•«£kicnt air to operate the drills efficient-
h" as the contract required. In his memo-
rar.iiim decision, the judge set forth that 
5priguc's duties included the obligation to 
isrr.ish "sufficient air to efficiently operate 
Bevies' drills," and his findings do recite 
£a: Sprague performed his part of the 
<w.:ract. and further state: 
"While there were times when 
Bevies were temporarily hampered by 
Uck of air, they were such as would 
** reasonably expected to occur on the 
j ^ . and not sufficient in time or effect 
•»<> constitute a rescission or cancella-
:
*-^ n of the contract." 
-••x '^.'k-ring the memorandum decision and 
fe
' endings together, as may properly be 
An °I>inion or memorandum of decision 
a court sitting as trier of the fact 
*ay !>•> consulted where the findings of 
a
**
T
 and conclusions of law are innde-
llT
"- Tf that opinion or memorandum 
^'."iins rlio findings of fact, that is suf-
, , , i r
- Life Savers Corp. v. Curt.iss 
l
'
A
-'
]> Co., 7 (Mr., 182 F.L'd 4, 0, intcr-
*"
Ml!
"P Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of 
[8,9] The next assignment of error to 
be considered arises out of the finding 
above quoted. Boylcs insist that the use 
of the term "rescission" shows that the 
trial court applied the wrong theory of law 
in the case in that he was under the im-
pression that any breach by Sprague must 
have been sufficient to amount to rescission, 
whereas, any substantial breach by him 
would have justified Boyles' refusing to 
further perform. Boyles urges that be-
cause this apparently erroneous concept 
of law underlies the judgment, it should 
be set aside. It is not to be disputed that, 
as Boyles contends, different considera-
tions are involved in rescission than in a 
case which will justify one party in refus-
ing to perform because of breach by the 
other.6 But as the eminent authority, Mr. 
Williston, points out, the term "rescission" 
is often loosely used "when in truth one 
party to the contract has merely exercised 
his right to refuse to perform because of 
the wrongful conduct of the other party." 7 
We recognize the distinction between the 
two situations: where a contract has been 
completely abandoned or otherwise com-
pletely rescinded, it has been nullified. 
But where the contract has merely been 
breached, in other words, where one party 
has failed or refused to perform some obli-
gation under it, the contract may still re-
main in force, and even though it does, the 
wronged party may be excused from fur-
ther performance and recover for loss oc-
casioned to him.8 In the instant case, it 
is true that the trial court used the term 
"rescission." Yet the full import of his 
findings indicates that he did not regard 
that as the true condition. The most cogent 
indication thereof is that he found that 
Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C.A., on which 
our own rule 52(a) is based. 
6. Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble. l.r>3 U.S. 
540, 14 S.Ct. 870, JIS L.Ed. 814. 
7. 5 Williston Contracts, Sec. loO.'i (Revis-
ed Ed.). 
8. See Restatement of Contracts. Sec. 274 
(1). 
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there was a breach by Boyles and dam-
ages flowing therefrom. The contention 
made by Bevies with respect to such finding 
cannot defeat the judgment. 
Another group of objections to the judg-
ment relates to damages: that there was 
neither sufficient competent evidence nor 
definite enough findings thereon to warrant 
the amounts assessed. The findings with 
respect thereto were based principally on 
the evidence of Mrs. Sprague, who kept the 
books for the plaintiff. Error is assigned 
in receiving certain work sheets containing 
a compilation of figures and computation 
of expenses incurred by Sprague in proc-
essing rock after Boyles had pulled out of 
the job, indicating equipment expense of 
$3,295.28, payroll of $2,289.94, a total of 
$5,585.22. These work sheets also showed 
that Sprague credited Boyles with 1,000 
tons of oversize rock sold by Sprague from 
the rock Boyles had processed. The ob-
jection made was that the sheets were not 
original entries made concurrent with the 
transaction. 
[10,11] It has been held, and we believe 
the ruling to be a salutary and expedient 
one, that where original book entries, docu-
ments or other data are so numerous, com-
plex, or cumbersome that they cannot be 
conveniently examined by the fact trier, 
or where it would materially aid the court 
and the parties in analyzing such material, 
that a competent person who has made such 
examination may present such evidence.9 
This is subject to the limitation that the 
evidence must be shown to be developed 
from records, books or documents, the com-
petency of which has been established, and 
the records must be available for examina-
tion by the opposing parties and the wit-
ness subject to cross-examination concern-
ing such evidence. The evidence here pre-
sented conformed to the above require-
ments. Mrs. Sprague testified to the man-
ner of keeping the books; she explained 
the exhibits and the underlying data, con-
sisting of payroll records, invoices, vouch-
9. See, Interstate Finance Corp. v. Com-
mercial Jewelry Co., 280 III. 110, 117 N. 
E. 440; see annotation 00 A.L.R. 1200, 
1220. 
ers and cancelled checks, all of which were 
present in court for inspection and she wa^  
there for cross-examination with respect 
to all of such matters. The trial court 
did not commit error in overruling the ob-
jection and receiving the evidence. 
[12, 13] Boyles also insist the fimllna 
made with respect to additional costs al-
lowed Sprague for operations after Bov]^ 
declined to finish performance is .insufii-
cient to support the judgment. In that re-
gard the court found: 'That by reason of 
said breaches of said contract on the par: 
of the defendant, the plaintiff, Sprague. 
suffered damages in the sum of $6,368.85. 
which sum was necessarily expended by 
plaintiff, Sprague, in performing those 
things required by the contract between 
the plaintiff and the defendant to be per-
formed by defendant over and above all 
credits given by plaintiff to defendant." 
In support of their assertion that this find-
ing is too vague and indefinite to support 
the award of damage Boyles seeks refuge 
in the case of Duggins v. Colby.10 In that 
case the trial court found only that regis-
tering sheep adds to their market value, 
and that by the failure of defendant to 
have certain sheep registered, plaintiffs 
damages were equal to the amount for 
which he compromised with his buyers. 
On appeal it was held that it was impossible 
to determine either from the record or the 
finding whether the judge applied the cor-
rect measure of damages. 
We do not regard the instant situation as 
analogous to the Duggins case. From the 
trial judge's memorandum opinion it ap-
pears that he specifically based his award 
on the amount Sprague had to expend on 
rock over and above the 48 cents per tor. 
he would have had to pay Boyles under the 
contract. This was the correct measure oi 
damages so long as Sprague procured the 
additional rock in the most economical way 
available. Hence we find this contention 
of the defendant to be without merit. 
10. 45 Utah 335, 145 P. 1012. 
f!4] 
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Boylcs seek to have excised from agreement between Sprague and the truck-
iud£Tncnt an item of $850 allowed 
partial reimbursement for the emfi&ic as 
2<uitv suffered for failing to complete con-
F^,"on of the levee within the time set 
contract. The penalty provi-
jffttCt 
- the prime 
alrainst Sprague was known to Boyles 
, thus would have been within the con-
gelation of the parties had their minds 
averted to breach.11 However, Boyles 
g-oonstrates that this delay was occasioned 
W Sprague's failure to keep the air pres-
Oft constant, and that because it was 
Wacuc's fault, he cannot charge Boyles 
„jth damages resulting from such delay, 
0Bnc Russell v. Bothwell & Swaner Co.12 
Ap:n referring to the judge's memoran-
Jmn decision, it is ob\ious that he did 
ers. 
The final item we consider is one of 
$626.67 Sprague asked as compensation 
for furnishing compressed air for one 
and one-third months beyond the time the 
contract should have been performed. The 
contract clearly required Sprague to fur-
nish the compressed air and neither the evi-
dence nor the findings show that furnishing 
it beyond the normal time of the contract 
made the cost to Sprague any greater. 
There is nothing beyond conjecture that 
the two items just referred to were prop-
erly chargeable as damages against Boyles. 
Accordingly they must be stricken from the 
judgment. 
Other assignments of error are deemed 
^pi} this rule. He awarded Sprague only t Q b e w i t h o u t s u f f i c i e n t m e H t t o w a r r a n t 
JKO of the $1,050 liquidated damage that
 d i s c u s s i o n . E x c e p t a s t o t h e t w 0 i t e m s j u s t 
Jpa-ie was required to pay, stating that
 m e n t i o n e d f t o t a n i n g $1,449.82, by which 
nfecrc were some days when Boyles was
 a m Q u n t t h c j u d g m e n t m u s t b e r e d u c e d , it 
4ca>cd or slowed by shortage of air, so 
tin 5prague should only charge 17 days 
i{»::i>t Boyles." Sprague's right to re-
cmcr such damages is not necessarily pre-
cede i by the fact that he also had the 
«£*»! under the contract to put on such ad-
fcror.al force as required to finish the con-
fnc! on time, unless it be shown that he 
ttasonably could have done so, but refused, 
%hich fact is not made to appear. 
[U] There are two items claimed by 
Sprairuc for which we do not find sufficient 
*??ort. The first is a charge of $823.15 
*-i:h Sprague claims was incurred because 
•t W;IH obliged to raise the haulage payment 
fc> iruckers from 70 to SO cents per ton. 
Tnc o-ily e\ ldcncc respecting this item is 
&c *:a:cment of I\Irs. Sprague that the 
toners complained about ha\ing to wait 
te i>c loaded; that Mr. Sprague had diffi-
°ri*} kupmrr truckers hired and on thc 
** '<>nd that Sprague initially paid 70 cents 
£T <•>.. and later increased to 80 cents. 
*
a:s
 e\idence docs not indicate with any 
**f'-c of certainty that Botes ' breach led 
to
 the increased costs. Thc raise in rates 
^ a r s to have been solely a matter of 
fl
-
 Sfk
" Hulloy v. Raxrndnle, 9 Exch. 341, 
«•* i:nK ru.p (is.^) 2.' <\.T S . I>unngog. 1
 -•*. P 4Mff. lfi AniJur. 4."Iff. 
is affirmed. Costs to appellants. 
McDONOUGH, C. J., and WADE and 
WORTHEX, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, Justice (dissenting in part). 
Although I agree with portions of the 
main opinion, there are parts thereof with 
which I find myself in disagreement. 
I do not agree that because the contract 
was signed after the work had commenced 
and after the plaintiff had failed to furnish 
compressed air as agreed, the trial court 
reasonably could believe that Boyles had 
waived such failure. It is just as reason-
able to believe that Boyles continued the 
work without waiving the breach, fully in-
tending to hold Sprague accountable for 
the breach, which a party to a bi-lateral 
contract well may do. 
I cannot agree that thc court's finding to 
the effect that Bo\les' being temporarily 
hampered by lack of air reasonably would 
be expected, is justified. If Sprague agreed 
to furnish air, failure to furnish it cannot 
be justified by saying such failure is to be 
expected, temporarily or otherwise. Rath-
12. 57 Utah 3G2, 194 P. 1109. 
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tr, it n IM-JI! i! Iv could be expeeted tint it 
would be tunu>h< 1 at all times a> agreed 
I cannot agree that the court used an ele-
rnentin w i 1 like ' rtb^isbion ' in a ' loose ' 
ua>, and that it the re tore did not mean 
what it sud To suggest differently is to 
discredit the court's competency 
I do not subscribe to the idea that data 
should be summarized and presented that 
way simply because it is so cumbersome 
that it "cannot be conveniently examined 
by the fact tr ier" If it is too cumbersome 
conveniently to be examined by the fact 
trier, by the same token it is too cumber-
some to be examined into by cross-examina-
tion 
I am not in accord with the conclusion 
that Bovles should be charged with any 
penalty arising out of a bond which 
Sprague obtained. Such penalty was not 
mentioned in the contract between Bo\les 
and Sprague, and is completely foreign to 
damages that naturally would flow from a 
contract that did not mention i t 
poor judgment in business affurs 
not ju^titv the ippointuient ot a * 
*EY NUMBER SYSTEM, 5 
4 Utah 2d 355 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Flor-
ence S. VALENTINE, Alleged 
Incompetent. 
No. 8415. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 8, 1956. 
Petition was filed for the appointment 
of a guardian of the property of an alleged 
incompetent The Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Clarence E. 
Baker, J , entered an order dismissing the 
petition, and the petitioner appealed The 
Supreme Court, Worthen, J , held that fact 
that alleged incompetent failed to take 
attorneys aduce and appeal from judg-
ment, which alhged incompetent considered 
was wrong, and fact that she allegedly used 
of her property 
Affirmed 
0*4 
1. Mental Health C^I37 
\\ here trial court, on petition for * , 
pointment of a guardian of the propr» 
of alleged incompetent, had alleged :rx*m[ 
petent before the trial court and heard tW 
statement of the petitioner as to whit tW 
petitioner would prove, and alleged lncta^ 
petent <=poke for herself, trial court d:J * | 
dismiss the petition without taking e\ de_ 
and affording petitioner an opportune*« 
establish incompetence of the alleged »> 
competent U C A 1953, 75-13-19. 
2. Mental Health OIOI 
The right of every individual to handk 
his own affairs, even at the expense of £»> 
sipatmg his fortune, is a right which fc 
jealousl> guarded, and which will not I t 
taken awa> by the appointment of a guu£ 
lan of his property, except in extreme e n 
U.C A 1953, 75-13-19. 
3. Mental Health C=3|05 
An uncooperative attitude or mutate 
as to business principles or legal rukt i i 
not sufficient to warrant the appomtaxaf 
of a guardian. U.C.A 1953, 75-13-19. 
4. Mental Health <£=>I05 
Fact that alleged incompetent failed tft 
take attorney's advice and appeal fro* 
judgment, which alleged incompetent co^ 
sidered was wrong, and fact that she & 
legediy used poor judgment in buiine* 
affairs, would not justify the appointed* 
of a guardian of her property. U C-V.195* 
75-13-19.1 
Irwin Amovitz, Salt Lake City, for + 
pellant. 
Fabian, Clendenm, Moffat & M***fc 
Peter W. Billings, Salt Lake City, m 
respondent. 
WORTHEN, Justice. 
Appeal from an order di^mi^ing a J*£ 
tion filed pursuant to Section 75-13-19, 
I. In re ITeath, 102 Utah 1, 12G P2d 1058 
